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the Lesson
Copyright law1 has a clearly established doctrine of “fairuse.”2  While its parameters are frequently debated, the ex-
istence of the doctrine is statutory and undisputed.  The laws gov-
erning patent3 and copyright are closely related and frequently
intertwine, yet this important area of copyright has not been
“taught” to patent law.  Instead, patentees and infringers alike
are typically left with more draconian, all-or-nothing options.
This often acts as a disincentive to innovation.  A clear and com-
prehensive doctrine of fair use in patent law, analogized from the
sister jurisprudence of copyright, would serve the interests of the
patent community, technology users, and public policy.
This Article considers the true purpose and accepted parame-
ters of United States patent law (Part I); what copyright teaches
patent law about fair use (Part II); the primary reasons why uni-
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my interest in and knowledge of this field, needless to say, this is an academic article
and the views expressed herein are purely my own.  That said, I gratefully acknowl-
edge the help, support, and inspiration of the following legal scholars, including
those who participated in the 2005 IP Colloquia at UCLA School of Law: Professor
Neil Netanel, Professor David Nimmer, Professor John McDermott, Professor Mark
Lemley, Professor Doug Lichtman, and the staff of the UCLA Law Library.  Thanks
also to the helpful staff of Oregon Law Review .  Special thanks to Professor Victor
Fleischer who donated valuable time and advice, and helped bring all of the pieces
together.
1 Copyright generally protects “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression.”  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
2 Id.  § 107.  For a fuller discussion, see infra Part II.A.
3 Patents may be obtained for inventions and discoveries that are new, useful, and
non-obvious. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
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versities and other infringers who would benefit most from a stat-
utory fair use doctrine in patent law do not advocate it — due to
their conflicting positions in what this Article terms the “Paradox
of the Patent Community” (Part III); and proposed solutions for
a “fair” patent system, including a statutory, copyright-style bal-
ancing test for fair use where appropriate, a grant of royalty-
bearing compulsory license in other cases, and in a smaller num-
ber of situations, no non-permissive rights at all (i.e., injunctive
relief for the patentee) (Part IV).  This logical scheme would sat-
isfy the intent of our Founding Fathers to “promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts”4 by rewarding patentees while en-
couraging follow-on innovation.
I
PARAMETERS AND RIGHTS UNDER PATENT LAW
A. The Purpose of Patent Law
A patent is a federally granted, limited right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling an invention, or from offering it
for sale or importing it into the United States.5  A patent is not
an absolute right,6 nor a monopoly,7 nor even a guarantee of the
patentee’s ability to legally practice the patented invention.8  A
patentee’s rights may be diminished by the existence of prior
blocking patents on underlying technology,9 conflicting state reg-
ulations,10 geographical restrictions,11 or the application of vari-
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 & cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
5 35 U.S.C. § 271(a); see also 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.01
(2005).
6 See  Cantrell v. Wallick, 117 U.S. 689, 694 (1886) (“Two patents may both be
valid when the second is an improvement on the first, in which event, if the second
includes the first, neither of the two patentees can lawfully use the invention of the
other without the other’s consent.”).
7 See id.  However, patents are sometimes viewed and have been characterized by
the Supreme Court as monopolies. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 n.13 (1984) (referring to “the constitutionally sanctioned
monopolies of the copyright and the patent”).  This characterization is generally dis-
favored and considered an over-generalization. See 5 CHISUM, supra  note 5,
§ 16.02[1][c].
8 5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.02[1].
9 Id.  § 16.02[1][a].
10 Id.  § 16.02[1][b].  One cannot practice a patent when doing so would violate
state or federal law. See, e.g. , Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 505 (1878) (hold-
ing that a patent on oil could not be enforced if the sale of that oil was prohibited by
law).
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ous equitable doctrines.12  Nevertheless, patents are powerful in
our modern technological society and they can be wielded with
enormous weight, whether an infringer is willful, knowledgeable
of the patent at all, or simply using another’s claimed technology
for his own non-commercial research.13  This is so because
United States patent law has no clear provision for a fair use doc-
trine, nor a clear exemption for infringement without intent.14
United States patent law as applied today is in some ways quite
divergent from its proper historical purpose.  The Supreme Court
has mused upon the true objectives of our patent system:
First, patent law seeks to foster and reward invention; second,
it promotes disclosure of inventions, to stimulate further inno-
vation and to permit the public to practice the invention once
the patent expires; third, the stringent requirements for patent
protection seek to assure that ideas in the public domain re-
main there for the free use of the public.15
This sound philosophy, essentially setting forth a balance of
interests, has been echoed by legal scholars over the years.16
11 See  35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000).
12 See  6 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 19.01.  Four major substantive defenses can pre-
clude enforcement of a patent against otherwise infringing conduct.  These are, gen-
erally:  (1) patent invalidity (which is a permanent remedy against the patentee); (2)
fraudulent procurement or inequitable conduct (also invalidating the patent grant);
(3) patent misuse or antitrust violation (expansive, but the patentee’s rights will be
restored once the misuse is “purged”); and (4) laches or estoppel (which is specific
to the conduct at issue). Id.
13 See  5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.02[4] (“One does not escape infringement by
using a patented invention for a purpose not contemplated or disclosed by the
patentee.”).
14 See id.  § 16.02[2] (“One making, using or selling matter covered by a patent
without authority of the owner infringes regardless of knowledge or intent.”); see
also Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35-36 (1997)
(“Application of the doctrine of equivalents . . . is akin to determining literal in-
fringement, and neither requires proof of intent.”); Intel Corp. v. U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, 946 F.2d 821, 832 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]here is no intent element to direct
infringement.”).
15 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948)) (“The copy-
right law, like the patent statute, makes reward to the owner a secondary considera-
tion.”); Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979).  Chief Justice
Burger delivered the opinion of the Aronson  Court, allowing parties to freely con-
tract for royalties to be paid if no patent is issued by the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO), although it is considered misuse to contract for royalties beyond
the expiration of the patent term. Id.  at 264-66.
16 See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law , 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1177 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of patent law, histor-
ically, is “to fashion an appropriate balance between the grant of exclusive rights to
encourage innovation and the maintenance of a viable public domain from which
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Our Founding Fathers also expressed views about patent law
that seem to have been lost over years of aggressive lobbying and
litigation.17  Commentator Ruth E. Freeburg notes that Thomas
Jefferson did not see inventions as being something to privately
retain like chattel or real property:
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lites his taper at mine, re-
ceives light without darkening me.  That ideas should freely
spread from one to another over the globe, for the . . . im-
provement of his condition, seems to have been . . . designed
by nature . . . incapable of confinement or exclusive appropria-
tion.  Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of
property.18
While analogies to real property may be appropriate under
certain circumstances,19 it should be considered that the subject
of a patent may in many cases be enjoyed—or even practiced—
by others without damage to the patentee.  In a recent article,
Professor Mark A. Lemley criticized the trend toward applying
the principles of real property law to intellectual property
further progress may result”); Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get?:
Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain , 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 91 (2004) (“[I]n
principle, most inventions have the potential to benefit society in two ways: (1)
through their direct utility to the users or consumers of embodiments of the inven-
tion; and (2) through the use of the inventive idea as a springboard to further inno-
vation.”); see also Ruth E. Freeburg, No Safe Harbor and No Experimental Use:  Is it
Time for Compulsory Licensing of Biotech Tools? , 53 BUFF. L. REV. 351 (2005) (ad-
vocating a balanced approach to fair use and compulsory licensing); Steven J. Gross-
man, Experimental Use or Fair Use as a Defense to Patent Infringement , 30 IDEA
243 (1990) (discussing the common law “experimental use doctrine”); Janice M.
Mueller, The Evanescent Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent In-
fringement Liability:  Implications for University and Nonprofit Research and Devel-
opment , 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 917 (2004) (examining recent federal circuit decisions
on fair use and their rationale).
17 In her 2000 article, Maureen A. O’Rourke explained that the trend in Congress,
the USPTO, and the courts is toward stronger patent protection because (1) the
judiciary is expanding the subject matter of protection to include technologies previ-
ously not patentable or even anticipated; (2) the USPTO is issuing at a record rate,
see infra  notes 28-31; and (3) the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals is upholding
patent validity more often.  O’Rourke, supra  note 16, at 1178-79.
18 Freeburg, supra note 16, at 391 (alteration in original) (quoting THOMAS JEF-
FERSON, WRITINGS 1291-92 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., Library of America 1984)).
Freeburg also cites Lawrence Lessig: “With ordinary property, the law must both
create an incentive to produce and protect the right of possession; with intellectual
property, the law need only create the incentive to produce.” Id.  (quoting LAW-
RENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 133 (1999)).
19 See  Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 642 (1999) (citing Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876)) (“A
patent for an invention is as much property as a patent for land.”).
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rights.20  Lemley argues:
The assumption that intellectual property owners should be
entitled to capture the full social surplus of their invention
runs counter to our economic intuitions in every other seg-
ment of the economy.  We do not permit producers to capture
the full social value of their output.  Nor do we permit the
owners even of real property to internalize the full positive
externalities associated with their property.21
Thus, sharing others’ intellectual property is not at all like
barging into their front parlor while they are sleeping, but rather
resembles enjoying the fragrance of your neighbor’s roses from
your own backyard.22  Technology, like the fragrance of a rose-
bush, is not taken from its owner merely because it is enjoyed by
another.23
To push the analogy a step further, improving another’s tech-
nology is like putting a hummingbird feeder on the border of
your neighbor’s garden.  The benefit it provides to the neighbor’s
flowers—along with positive externalities to their nursery busi-
ness—can certainly be as great as the benefit you enjoy in sitting
on a bench under the feeder while smelling their roses.  Clearly,
this was the intent of Congress in allowing an inventor to patent
an “improvement” on someone else’s invention.24  It allows both
the patentee of the underlying technology and the patentee of
the improvement to benefit from each other’s technology with-
out necessarily detracting economically or otherwise.  Such im-
provements are akin to joining forces with your neighbor in a
profitable aviary/nursery.
Today, the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) sets forth its understanding of the purpose of patent
law in its Mission Statement: “The USPTO mission is to ensure
that the intellectual property system contributes to a strong
global economy, encourages investment in innovation, and fos-
ters entrepreneurial spirit.”25  This seems slightly off-kilter from
the idyllic balance of interests envisioned by Thomas Jefferson.
Nevertheless, it is no wonder that the USPTO and the courts
20 Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding , 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031 (2005).
21 Id.  at 1046.
22 See id.  at 1048.
23 See id.
24 See  35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
25 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Mission, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/ in-
tro.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
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have a hard time articulating a clear fair use doctrine in patent
law.  Congress has not yet created one.
B. Why a Fair Use Doctrine is Necessary in Patent Law
While there is ostensibly a strict procedure for proving the
value and patentability of an invention through the USPTO ex-
amination process, there is no shortage of disputes over the va-
lidity of the many thousands of patents that make it through each
year.26  There have been over seven million patents issued by the
United States government since the first was granted on July 31,
1790.27  The number has increased dramatically over the years.
In the year 1790, three utility patents were issued.28  A century
later, technology was taking off and 25,308 utility patents were
issued in 1890.29  In 1940, the number was 42,237.30  In 2004, the
last year for which data is currently available from the USPTO,
164,293 utility patents were issued, more than doubling in the
past twenty years alone.31  Altogether, there were 1,633,355
United States utility patents actively in force in 2004.32  That is a
lot of technology for a university (or any) researcher to sort
through if he really wished to get permission from every patentee
who may possibly allege any kind of infringement by his re-
search.  This is especially true of method claims, which can be
difficult to locate in a prior-art search due to their potential
breadth.
Since a patent currently grants a presumptive right to injunc-
tive relief,33 many scholars, researchers, businesspeople, and le-
26 See O’Rourke, supra  note 16, at 1239 n.245 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A.
Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents , 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
205-08 (1998)) (describing the results of their study, which demonstrated that forty-
six percent of litigated patents were found invalid, generally for obviousness).
27 PATENT TECH. MONITORING DIV., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
PTMD PRODUCTS AND SERVICES Brochure, available at  http://www.uspto.gov/ web/
offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/brochure.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2005).
28 PATENT TECH. MONITORING DIV., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S.
PATENT ACTIVITY CALENDAR YEARS 1790 TO THE PRESENT 1 (2005), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.pdf.
29 Id.  at 2.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Id. at 4.
32 E-mail from Paul Harrison, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to author (Nov.
21, 2005) (on file with author).  This was an increase of 3.75% over the prior year
alone. See  e-mail from Paul Harrison, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to author
(July 15, 2005) (on file with author) (providing the number of active utility patents in
2003).
33 See  Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 430 (1908)
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gal practitioners have expressed concern about the over-
extension of patent ownership.34  These concerns seem rightly
placed.  Even the federal government has begun to take note.  In
a highly acclaimed (and debated) report issued in October 2003,
the Federal Trade Commission discussed ways of improving the
patent system.35  The report noted that researchers and compa-
nies currently engage in “willful ignorance” in order to avoid al-
legations of “willful infringement” that carry penalties of treble
damages:
Some Hearings participants explained that they do not read
their competitors’ patents out of concern for such potential
treble damage liability.  Failure to read competitors’ patents
can jeopardize plans for a noninfringing business or research
strategy, encourage wasteful duplication of effort, delay fol-
low-on innovation that could derive from patent disclosures,
and discourage the development of competition.36
(“Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law confers upon the
patentee” even though the patentee was apparently not using or commercializing
the claimed invention).  This presumption is being questioned by Congress in the
draft 2005 Patent Reform Legislation.  While that particular aspect of the legislation
appears to be dead in the water, the same issue is interestingly being questioned in
parallel by the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C. , 126 S. Ct. 733 (2005) (mem.).  In this case, which is expected
to be heard and decided by June 2006, the Supreme Court will hear arguments on
the issue of whether the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in presuming
a patent holder’s right to an injunction.  In its grant of certiorari, the Court specifi-
cally asked that the parties brief and argue: “Whether this Court should reconsider
its precedents, including Continental Paper Bag Co., v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. , on
when it is appropriate to grant an injunction against a patent infringer.” Id.  (citation
omitted).  This would be a truly monumental change in patent law, and would be a
great step forward to a scheme of “fair use” and compulsory licensing.
34 See  Lemley, supra  note 20.  However, this overbreadth of patent rights has
been dealt with — at least ad hoc — in various forms, such as in the Supreme
Court’s decision in Integra , infra , Part I.E. See also Grossman, supra  note 16, at 258
(“Case law has shown a tolerance for consideration of the knowledge and intentions
of the infringer, whether or not there is identifiable or potential economic harm, and
whether there is use for profit, that is commercial in context.”); O’Rourke, supra
note 16, at 1180; Jonathan Krim, Evaluating a Patent System Gone Awry , WASH.
POST, May 5, 2005, at E1 (stating that Congress, which has “a track record of
strengthening intellectual property” will likely pass “reforms” albeit they may not
truly reform the problems of our current system).
35 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), available at  http://www.ftc.gov/
os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.  The report was met with a lot of interest in the patent
community, but some resentment as well, including by USPTO officials who claimed
that the report evidenced a lack of understanding of the necessity of monopoly
power inherent in the patent grant.
36 Id. at 16-17; see also  35 U.S.C. § 284 (2000) (allowing a court to increase dam-
ages up to three times the amount assessed); William F. Lee & Lawrence P. Cogs-
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An example of a resulting negative externality under current
law is the licensing practice of universities.  In order not to give
representations and warranties that would subject them to allega-
tions of willful infringement, universities generally do not do
prior-art searches.37  Enactment of a clear fair use doctrine in
patent law would eliminate this dilemma.  A properly applied
doctrine could, like its counterpart in copyright law, take into ac-
count a good faith belief that the infringement, while knowing,
was fair.38  With that protection in place, universities, research
institutions, and companies alike would have more incentive to
investigate existing technology so that they could truly innovate,
including innovations aimed at creating patentable improve-
ments and noninfringing “work-around” inventions.39
Another argument for fair use is the right of society to obtain
access to technology in exchange for granting exclusive rights to
a patentee.  We cannot assume that a patentee will act in the
public interest by commercializing a patented invention if it is
not in the patentee’s direct, short-term economic interest to do
so.  Consider, for example, a situation where a large, publicly
traded drug company, Pharma A, develops, buys, or otherwise
obtains a patent on an anthrax vaccine.  This could be hugely
well, III, Understanding and Addressing the Unfair Dilemma Created by the Doctrine
of Willful Patent Infringement , 41 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 424 (2004) (noting that under
current law, “it is unclear whether a finding of willful infringement requires a deter-
mination that the defendant had intentionally infringed or whether a showing of
recklessness or even negligence would suffice”).  In either case, there appears to be
no provision for a good faith belief of fair use as a defense to infringement under
current patent law.
37 Universities also lack sufficient economic resources to undertake extensive re-
view of their patent portfolios.
38 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (regarding fair use in copyright law); Michael J.
Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use , 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525,
1555-56 (2004) (arguing that “the question ought not to be whether the defendant
believed that he or she was acting legitimately, but whether the outcome of the
defendant’s efforts was more socially valuable than the outcome produced by al-
lowing the copyright holder to enjoin the use or obtain payment”).
39 There is reason to hope that an exemption for good faith belief in valid use may
already be on its way with the 2005 Patent Reform Legislation.  In the proposed
changes to 35 U.S.C. § 284, there would be no “willful infringement” if the infringer
“had an informed good faith belief that the patent was invalid or unenforceable, or
would not be infringed by the conduct later shown to constitute infringement of the
patent.”  Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (emphasis
added) (introduced by Rep. Lamar Smith).  Broadly interpreted, this would include
a belief of fair use, though of course it would be a lot easier to make that argument if
Congress were to add an accompanying provision setting forth a fair use balancing
test as advocated in this Article. See infra  Part IV.A.
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profitable since the United States has already been attacked with
anthrax, and the fear of future anthrax attacks remains.  How-
ever, vaccines, while socially valuable, are a risky business for
companies.40  Now suppose that Pharma A also obtains a patent
on a higher-revenue-generating therapy for treating anthrax.
While the public would clearly benefit from a vaccine, Pharma A
would rather avoid the low profit margins and high liability of
vaccines in favor of its therapeutic treatment.  Accordingly,
Pharma A may simply sit on its vaccine rights, neither commer-
cializing nor allowing others to commercialize—or even re-
search—the patented technology.  Pharma A can instead stand
by and watch the U.S. population become infected with anthrax,
thereby driving up the market for Pharma A’s therapeutic an-
thrax treatment, for which Pharma A can then surely charge
huge monopoly rents.  Under current United States patent law,
Pharma A is generally entitled to do this.41  This situation, where
public health is at issue, presents a prime candidate for a fair use
analysis and perhaps a compulsory license of the vaccine
technology.42
We also cannot assume that a license will always be available
or affordable for follow-on innovation.  In some cases, more li-
censes would be needed to practice an invention than could be
justified by projected revenue.  Consider a scenario in the
crowded field of biotechnology.  Researcher 1 holds a patent to a
composition of matter.  Researcher 2 finds that the composition
of matter can be used to treat schizophrenia, and he obtains a
patent on that method of use.  Researcher 3 then finds that the
40 See  Bernard Wysocki, Jr., Agency Chief Spurs Bioterror Research — And Con-
troversy , WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2005, at A1 (“Publicly traded drug companies have
tended to stay away from vaccines, antibiotics and related drugs.  These products
have low profit margins and are especially prone to liability suits.”).
41 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) reads in relevant part:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contribu-
tory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his having done
one or more of the following . . . refused to license or use any rights to the
patent . . . .
42 Commentator David C. Hoffman notes:  “Proponents of the patent system as-
sume that most patent holders will act rationally to maximize the economic utility of
their inventions by freely granting licenses.”  David C. Hoffman, A Modest Propo-
sal:  Toward Improved Access to Biotechnology Research Tools by Implementing a
Broad Experimental Use Exception , 89 CORNELL L. REV. 993, 1010-11 (2004). This is
not always true, particularly in the biotechnology area where inventions “stand on
the shoulders” of prior innovations. Id.  See infra  Part IV.B. for a fuller discussion
about this author’s proposed compulsory license scheme.
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composition of matter can also be used to treat epilepsy, and she
obtains a patent on that method of use.  In order to market (or
even research) the compound developed by Researcher 1 for the
purposes discovered by Researchers 2 and 3 to be effective, any
of Researchers 1, 2, or 3 would need a license from the other.
Certainly for follow-on Researchers 4, 5, 6 . . . 100, trying to work
through the thicket would be daunting, if even possible.  Further-
more, one patentee may, under current law, legally refuse to li-
cense under any terms whatsoever, rendering the rest of the
developments unusable.43  This type of licensing thicket is very
common, particularly in the biotechnology arena.44  Here again,
a fair use doctrine (or in some cases a compulsory license
scheme)45 would resolve many of the administrative problems of
ad hoc licensing or infringement, thereby resulting in an efficient
system that benefits society through further innovation.
Furthermore, the scenarios are not limited to healthcare con-
cerns.  An oil company may purchase exclusive patent rights to
an alternative-fuel technology.  Although the alternative-fuel
technology may be very valuable or even necessary to the United
States economy in the aggregate, the oil company is entitled to
quietly hold onto the patent rights without practicing the inven-
tion or allowing others to practice it.  Indeed, the oil company
may not have even developed the alternative-fuel technology it-
self, but may have purchased the patent rights essentially for the
purpose of secreting the technology.  As long as there are no an-
titrust or other legal violations, there is currently no overriding
requirement in United States patent law that would require the
oil company to practice the technology or grant a license to
others to do so.  This seems unfair to the public, which justifiably
expects a return for the grant of exclusionary patent rights.
In reality, it is in a patentee’s best interest to have a clear fair
use doctrine, since (1) it would clarify expectations about which
infringing behaviors may be actionable, thereby avoiding ad hoc
application of a common law doctrine; and (2) it is a relatively
less draconian doctrine compared to the invalidity charges faced
by most patentees when they bring infringement lawsuits.  Since
invalidity is a binding determination across the board, the results
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4).
44 See  Freeburg, supra  note 16, at 404-09; Hoffman, supra  note 42, at 1009-11.
45 Hoffman, supra note 42, at 1039-41. See infra  Part IV.B. for a fuller discussion
about this author’s proposed compulsory license scheme.
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can be economically devastating for a business that suddenly
finds many millions of dollars of research and development down
the drain, compared with a specific, case-by-case finding of non-
actionable fair use that does not affect third parties.46
It is also in the interest of constitutional goals,47 society, and
every taxpayer to have a fair use doctrine in United States patent
law.  Every year the federal government spends billions of dol-
lars on research contracts and grants.  While universities are
some of the main recipients of this money,48 the federal govern-
ment funds studies by research institutions, nonprofit organiza-
tions, and private companies as well.  These expenditures are less
likely to lead to meaningful developments if university and other
researchers self-censure or if taxpayer money is wasted on unrea-
sonable license fees or damage awards to patentees.
Meanwhile, without a clear fair use doctrine, many are taking
matters into their own hands.  The National Institutes of Health,
for example, in a frustrated effort to disseminate research results,
has created databases and issued guidelines intended to cut down
the proprietary nature of research results.49  Although this may
indeed be a noble effort given the current climate against appli-
cation of fair use in patent law, it should awaken those with a
keen interest in preserving protections to act in turn, by enforc-
46 See generally, Allison & Lemley, supra note 26, regarding frequent judicial
findings of invalidity.
47 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48 According to a self-reporting survey, universities noted that they received $41.2
billion in research funds in 2004 (an increase of 7.1% over 2003), sixty-seven percent
of which was from the federal government. ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS,
AUTM U.S. LICENSING SURVEY:  FY 2004 14 (2005), available at  http://
www.autm.net/events/File/FY04%20Licensing%20Survey/04AUTM-USLicSrvy-
public.pdf.  See infra  Part IV for a fuller description of the role of universities in the
patent fair use debate.
49 See  Eric Wills, American Chemical Society Lobbies Against a Free NIH
Database That it Sees as a Competitor , CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 16, 2005; see
also OFFICE OF EXTRAMURAL RESEARCH, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, NIH GRANTS
POLICY STATEMENT (2003), available at  http://grants2.nih.gov/grants/ policy/
nihgps_2003/NIHGPS_Part7.htm (“It is NIH policy that the results and accomplish-
ments of the activities that it funds should be made available to the public.”).  These
guidelines generally discourage indiscriminate patent filings.
Scientists and legal scholars are also starting to gather together in a group
modeled after—and owned by—copyright’s “Creative Commons.”  The “Science
Commons,” a project of Creative Commons, states as its mission:  “Our goal is to
encourage stakeholders to create areas of free access and inquiry using standardized
licenses and other means:  a ‘Science Commons’ built out of voluntary private agree-
ments.”  Science Commons, Welcome to Science Commons, http://sciencecom-
mons.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
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ing respect for ownership and allowing infringement only in a
controlled and balanced fashion.  Among this crowd are the ma-
jor research universities that turn a blind eye to infringement
when it is their own, but are keen to stop fair use by others when
the university is the owner.50  A clear fair use doctrine would
eliminate this paradoxical position by providing explicit guide-
lines for both owners and infringers.
Professor Maureen A. O’Rourke made an innovative argu-
ment for a clear fair use doctrine in 2000, before the Federal Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals severely narrowed what little common law
doctrine existed.51  Certainly, that argument is even more neces-
sary today, although I would note that it is not as radical as Pro-
fessor O’Rourke suggested.  Rather, I propose it is merely a
logical step, ultimately as beneficial to patentees as to those who
would infringe.
C. The History of Various Fair Use Exemptions in Patent Law
There is some historical basis for a fair use doctrine in United
States patent law.  Such application is made more complicated,
however, by the challenge of what to even call such a doctrine.
The existing common law exemption has variably been called the
“common-law research exemption”;52 “experimental use de-
fense”;53 “experimental use exemption”;54 and the “experimental
purpose doctrine,”55 among others.  Each of these characteriza-
tions has slightly different implications.  The existing common
law doctrine is rarely, though, if ever, referred to as what it really
is—a fair use doctrine in patent law.  This doctrine needs to be
clarified and expanded by Congress.56
The existing common law doctrine of fair use in patent law
stems from a decision by Justice Story in the 1813 case of Whitte-
50 See infra  Part III for a fuller discussion about the complex paradox of patent
users and owners, particularly universities.
51 See  O’Rourke, supra  note 16 (arguing for copyright-style fair use in patent law,
but in a moderated manner).
52 See  Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 863 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
53 See  Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
54 See Mueller, supra  note 16, at 917.
55 See  5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.03[1].
56 As further explored herein, there is a specific statutory fair use doctrine in Title
35, at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000).  This was the subject of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
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more v. Cutter .57  In a discussion about the purpose of patent law,
Justice Story opined that there must be legal protection for one
who acts “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the pur-
pose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the [patented invention] to
produce its described effects.”58  Several scholars have noted that
the word “philosophical” was used in Justice Story’s time to refer
to what we now call “scientific.”59  In other words, Justice Story’s
opinion suggests that infringement for the purpose of scientific
inquiry should not be actionable.60
Although he may not have known just how important it would
still be two hundred years later, neither did Justice Story aban-
don the common law fair use doctrine he had created.61  Just a
few months after the Whittemore  decision, he cited it with ap-
proval.62  In a prescient discussion that sets forth a true balance
of interest as relevant today as it was then, Justice Story noted
that infringement must include “an intent” not only to “infringe
the patent-right” but also to “deprive the owner of the lawful
rewards of his discovery.”63  In short, patent protection should
extend only where there is specific intent to harm the interest of
the patentee.
Since Justice Story’s time, the common law fair use doctrine
has been of great interest to scholars,64 but apparently not as
much so to courts65 or Congress.  The doctrine has only identifi-
ably been applied positively in six cases (to deny infringement)66
57 Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).  Nu-
merous scholars have taken note of this origin. See Integra , 331 F.3d at 874-75 (New-
man, J., dissenting); Mueller, supra  note 16, at 927.
58 Whittemore , 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
59 Integra , 331 F.3d at 875 n.8 (Newman, J., dissenting); Mueller, supra  note 16, at
929 (“Multiple authorities confirm that in Story’s day philosophical meant
scientific.”).
60 Even assuming that we leave the word “philosophical” as is, the result should
be the same.
61 See Mueller, supra  note 16, at 928.
62 Sawin v. Guild, 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
63 Id.
64 See supra  note 16 for a partial list of scholars who have considered the impor-
tance of expanding the common law experimental use doctrine.
65 There are exceptions, however, such as Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA , 331 F.3d 860, 874-75 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman,
J., dissenting), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
66 See  5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.03[1][b]; see also  Kaz Mfg. Co. v. Chese-
brough-Ponds, Inc., 317 F.2d 679 (2d Cir. 1963) (upholding dismissal of infringement
action where defendant only used patentee’s product for illustrative purposes in ad-
vertising); Finney v. United States, 209 Ct. Cl. 742 (1976) (unpublished) (allowing
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and recognized but held inapplicable in roughly a dozen others.67
Except for the specific drug-development exemption codified
in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e),68 Congress has not acted to include any
further iterations of fair use in patent law.  Indeed, as this Article
goes to press, Congress is weighing the 2005 Patent Reform Leg-
islation, which, if passed as written in its committee print of June
1, 2005, or a similar version,69 will bring sweeping changes to the
United States patent system.  However, fair use is not mentioned
in the bill.70  Indeed, at a conference about the pending legisla-
tion in the summer of 2005, Congressman Adam Schiff71 con-
firmed in response to a question from the audience72 that no
provision on fair use was considered, nor would one be likely to
pass the strict, business-oriented Judiciary Committee.73
experimental use defense to be invoked at trial); Chesterfield v. United States, 159
F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958) (infringement denied because the United States only
used patented technology experimentally); Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (infringing device excluded from consideration because it was used
experimentally only); Akro Agate Co. v. Master Marble Co., 18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D.
W. Va. 1937) (patented machine used only for experimental purpose of testing effi-
cacy, etc.); Ruth v. Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935) (infring-
ing parts sold to Colorado School of Mines excluded from damage calculation
because they were used for experimental purposes in the lab), rev’d on other
grounds , 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936), abrogated by  Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
In Kaz Manufacturing , the court clearly relied on lack of intent to infringe as a
defense.  In a footnote, the court further cited the defendant’s clever wording as an
example:  “[O]ne who constructs a patented wall safe but uses it only as an anchor
for his boat would not be a patent infringer since such use would not be for the
purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent.” Kaz Mfg. , 317 F.2d at 680 n.3.
67 See  5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.03[1][b]; Mueller, supra  note 16, at 918-19
(“In the Federal Circuit’s four precedential decisions [since 1982] in which an ac-
cused infringer asserted a common law-based experimental use defense, not once
has the Federal Circuit applied the doctrine to absolve liability.”); see also Integra ,
331 F.3d 860; Madey , 307 F.3d 1351; Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir.
1984), superceded by statute , Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, § 202, 98 Stat. 1585, 1603 (1984) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000)).
68 See infra  Parts I.D.-E., discussing the case of Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifes-
ciences I, Ltd. , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
69 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005) (introduced by Rep.
Lamar Smith).
70 Derivative terms of fair use, such as “research exemption” or “experimental use
doctrine,” are also missing.
71 Congressman Adam Schiff (D-California) is a member of the House Judiciary
Committee, as well as the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property.
72 Admittedly, the question came from this author.
73 Congressman Adam Schiff, Remarks at a luncheon program sponsored by the
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D. The Apparent Death of “Fair Use”:  The Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals, 2002-2003
In its 2002-2003 session, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals74
decided two key cases regarding fair use in patent law.  In both
cases, the majority opinions took an extremely narrow view of
any application of “fair use.”  The first case, Madey v. Duke Uni-
versity , concerned the common law fair use doctrine.75  The sec-
ond case, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA , related to
a specific statutory exemption for drug-development.76  By de-
clining to apply either the common law or the statutory fair use
doctrines in these two cases, the court virtually sounded the
death knell on fair use in patent law.77
1. Madey v. Duke
The Madey v. Duke  decision brought to the forefront the issue
of infringement via scientific research.  In particular, the univer-
sity community experienced a chill when the court clearly noted
that there is no blanket halo for educational or research institu-
tions to infringe.78  Dr. John M.J. Madey was a former Stanford
University professor who gained sole ownership of two patents
that he later brought with him to Duke University to be practiced
in a research lab that he set up there.79  Duke eventually dis-
law firm of Christie, Parker & Hale at the California Institute of Technology (July 7,
2005). Interestingly, however, the House Committee on the Judiciary did recom-
mend a research exemption in a 1990 bill known as the “Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 1990.”  H.R. 5598, 101st Cong. (1990).  Perhaps
even more interesting, the Committee apparently believed that a statutory research
exemption would merely “codify and clarify current case law in the United States
which currently excludes experimental use or research as an act of infringement.”
H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. 1, at 41 (1990).  The Committee added:  “It is a central
tenet of American patent law that there is a right to use scientific information to
create new and better inventions in competition with the patented invention.” Id.
74 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, created in 1982, has sole jurisdiction on
most patent appeals and thus, absent Supreme Court intervention, has exclusive au-
thority on most issues in patent law.
75 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
76 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
77 In an article written before the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Merck ,
Janice M. Mueller characterized the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions as unnecessa-
rily rigid and formalistic interpretations of the law. See Mueller, supra  note 16, at
962 (“Through its four experimental use decisions culminating in Integra , the Fed-
eral Circuit has effectively shrunk the availability of the experimental use defense to
a practical nullity.”).
78 Madey , 307 F.3d at 1360-61.
79 Id.  at 1352.
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missed Madey from his position but continued to operate some
of the equipment in the research lab, thereby practicing Madey’s
patented technology without permission.80  Madey brought suit
and Duke responded with several defenses, including the com-
mon law fair use doctrine, referred to in this case as the “experi-
mental use defense.”81  The district court agreed with Duke’s
defense and found no actionable infringement.82
On appeal, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals held in no
uncertain terms that the “experimental use defense” did not ap-
ply to Duke’s use of the patented technology.83  In doing so, the
court did recognize the existence of the doctrine, stating: “Our
precedent, to which we are bound, continues to recognize the ju-
dicially created experimental use defense, however, in a very lim-
ited form.”84  The opinion further commented that not only is the
“slightest commercial implication”85 sufficient to defeat the de-
fense but so is “any conduct that is in keeping with the alleged
infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of commercial implica-
tions.”86  Rather, the court held that the common law doctrine is
“very narrow and limited to actions performed ‘for amusement,
to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry.’”87
So, in the case of a major research university like Duke that spe-
cifically claims it does “not undertake research or development
work principally for the purpose of developing patents and com-
mercial applications,” infringement for the lofty purposes of
“teaching, research and the expansion of knowledge” was suffi-
cient to defeat the defense.88
If indeed a university actionably infringes patented technology
whether using it for purposes of direct commercialization, re-
search, or education, then it would be difficult to imagine a sce-
nario in which a major research university could ever use
another’s unlicensed, patented technology without incurring lia-
80 Id.  at 1352-53.
81 Id.
82 Id.  at 1355.
83 Id.  at 1362-63.
84 Id.  at 1360.
85 Id.  at 1362 (quoting Embrex, Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343, 1353
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring)).
86 Id.
87 Id.  (quoting Embrex , 216 F.3d at 1349).
88 Id.  at 1356 (quoting DUKE UNIV., POLICY ON INVENTIONS, PATENTS, AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, Preamble and Objectives, available at  http://
www2.mc.duke.edu/admin/aa/policy/invent1.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005)).
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bility.  The Duke  court put the nail in that coffin by adding, cor-
rectly, that Duke, “like other major research institutions of
higher learning, is not shy in pursuing an aggressive patent licens-
ing program from which it derives a not insubstantial revenue
stream.”89  This is factually accurate but inapposite.  Duke was
presumably not suggesting it could market Madey’s technology
commercially without a license.  The question should more
clearly have been directed toward Duke’s research purposes.
The Duke  case may actually not have been the best test case
for universities to plead a research exemption, since Duke was in
fact using the patented technology for the very purpose it was
intended, rather than experimenting on it to create something
new, as is so often done by university (and other) researchers.
Therefore, at least one commentator has suggested that while
Duke perhaps should not have prevailed after all, the case could
simply have been decided on more narrow grounds.90  Mean-
while, with the language employed by the Duke  court, there has
been an inevitable chilling effect on universities and their re-
searchers, many of whom are just now realizing that maybe they
do not get to create their own set of rules after all.91
2. Integra v. Merck
As noted previously, there is a very specific statutory fair use
doctrine in United States patent law for certain actions related to
drug development.  The statute reads in relevant part: “It shall
not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
89 Id.  at 1363 n.7.
90 See Mueller, supra  note 16, at 940.
91 See, e.g. , Memorandum from William Hopper & Michelle D. Christy, Office of
Research & Project Admin., Princeton Univ., to Faculty, Research and Technical
Staff, Princeton Univ. (Dec. 29, 2003), available at  http://www.princeton.edu/orpa/
memos/DukevMadeymemo012904.htm (warning researchers “to be mindful of their
use of patented technologies in their respective research activities and to continue to
acquire the appropriate rights before using such technologies”).  Also, this author,
while writing this Article, received a letter from a purported patentee, threatening
possible infringement action for research allegedly going on in a laboratory at
UCLA (letter on file with author).  Public universities such as the University of Cali-
fornia are probably subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity from patent infringe-
ment liability (at least for now) pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling in Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educational Expense Board v. College Savings Bank , 527
U.S. 627, 646-47 (1999), even though Congress had tried to abrogate that immunity
when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(h) in 1992.  Congress may try again more success-
fully in the future.  For a fuller discussion about universities and their place in the
debate over fair use in patent law, see infra  Part III, describing the Paradox of the
Patent Community.
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. . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates
the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”92
The issue in Integra v. Merck  involved the parameters and ap-
plication of this statutory provision to pre-clinical research.93
Specifically, there was a question as to how far back in time the
exemption reaches and whether it protected sponsored research
done at the nonprofit Scripps Research Institute, if that research
was pre-clinical only and if some or all of the results of the re-
search might never actually be submitted to the Food and Drug
Administration for approval.94
In an opinion by Judge Rader, the majority held that the ex-
emption should only be enforced under extremely narrow condi-
tions.95  The court further opined that the common law fair use
doctrine, referred to in the case as the “common-law research
exemption,” was not only not  at issue, but should not be consid-
ered at all material to the court’s decision.96  In a powerful dis-
sent, Judge Newman disagreed with both statements,  declaring
instead that the pre-clinical research fell squarely under both
common law and statutory definitions of fair use.97
An interesting and somewhat radical opinion, Judge Newman’s
dissent argued that it is totally fair for someone to use patented
technology for the purpose of reviewing an experiment, creating
work-around technology, or creating an improvement.98  As she
sagely noted, refusing to accept and apply the common law re-
search exemption would undermine the rationale for allowing
improvements to be independently patentable99:
Were such research subject to prohibition by the patentee the
advancement of technology would stop, for the first patentee
in the field could bar not only patent-protected competition,
but all research that might lead to such competition, as well as
barring improvement or challenge or avoidance of patented
technology.100
92 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000).
93 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), va-
cated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).  This was an entirely different panel of judges from the
one that ruled in Madey v. Duke .
94 See id.  at 865-68.
95 See id.  at 866.
96 Id.  at 863 n.2.
97 See id.  at 876-77 (Newman, J., dissenting).
98 See id. at 875-76.
99 See id.
100 Id.  at 875.
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Noting that the common law fair use doctrine in patent law has
the same origins as the fair use doctrine in copyright,101 Judge
Newman suggested that 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) was Congress’ answer
to parallel fair use doctrines in patent and copyright law.102  If
this were true, one might note that Congress could have been a
great deal clearer and broader in its language, opening it up be-
yond drug development.  Recognizing this, perhaps, Judge New-
man went on to boldly argue that the statutory exemption comes
in where the common law exemption ends.103  Still, one has the
sense that this is not what Congress intended, although perhaps it
should have been.
Meanwhile, Judge Newman’s view would not give blanket per-
mission to infringe, nor would it necessarily obviate the ability to
patent research tools.  As she cleanly noted, we must be able to
distinguish between “investigation into  patented things, as has al-
ways been permitted, and investigation using  patented things, as
has never been permitted.”104  She opined that this was simply
misunderstood by the Duke majority.105
E. A Surprising Savior: The Supreme Court’s Integra Decision
In a well-written and potentially very significant holding, the
Supreme Court issued its reversal of Integra v. Merck  on June 13,
2005.106  Putting aside discussions about the Supreme Court’s
presumed rationale,107 the opinion is simply a good one for pro-
moting fair use in patent law.
Writing for a unanimous court,108 Justice Scalia largely vetted
the comments of Judge Newman’s federal circuit dissent.  In
what will probably become a famous quote, the Court held that
there must be a “wide berth” of exemption for activities, regard-
101 Id.  at 876 n.9.  For a fuller discussion of the parallels between copyright and
patent law and their common origins, see infra  Part II.
102 Integra , 331 F.3d at 876 n.9 (Newman, J., dissenting).
103 Id.  at 876.  Presumably, the converse applies as well.
104 Id.  at 878 n.10 (emphasis added).
105 See id. ; see also  Mueller, supra  note 16, at 943.
106 See Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
107 Cynics note that big pharmaceutical companies supported the position taken
by the Supreme Court and that, therefore, the Court did not stray far from its recent
presumed favoritism of big business interests. See  Andrew Pollack, Justices Expand
Rights to Experiment with Patented Drugs , N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at C1 (noting
big pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies supported a broad interpretation
of the research exemption).
108 It is encouraging that the Supreme Court felt so strongly about the need for a
broad fair use doctrine that there was no dissent.
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less of clinical stage, “reasonably related to the development and
submission of any  information under the FDCA.”109  As an ex-
ample, the Court noted that the FDA is required to balance the
respective values of safety and efficacy for any given applica-
tion.110  Applicants must submit data to support the results of
such tests.111  The Court reasoned, therefore, that an applicant’s
use of infringing technology to test for safety and efficacy is rea-
sonably related and generally protectable.112  Since no one has a
crystal ball on the results of such tests ex ante, applicants, and
even their upstream researchers, must test more compounds
more broadly than will likely be submitted to the FDA for ap-
proval.113  The Court concluded that applicants and their prede-
cessor researchers must be allowed leeway to infringe for these
purposes.114
Interestingly, by exempting certain activities based on the pur-
pose of the infringement, the Court added an intent element to
the statute that might not actually be there.  This result of (dare I
say it?) rare judicial activism is actually important in this case
because an exemption based on intent is the first step toward a
broader fair use doctrine.  Furthermore, although the Court did
not specifically address the application of the common law fair
use doctrine, it did mention the doctrine in passing as having
been properly applied by the district court to exempt certain
early, infringing activities.115  Thus the Court not only signifi-
cantly expanded the statutory fair use doctrine, it also tacitly en-
dorsed the common law doctrine.
While the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision (and
Judge Newman’s dissent) is tempting, it does not quite square
with the actual language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e).  Indeed, a broad
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s opinion would open up
the statutory exemption to any research that might potentially
support an FDA drug application one day, regardless of the un-
derlying technology.  For example, a scientist working in Univer-
sity X’s physics department may test out another’s patent on cold
109 Merck , 125 S. Ct. at 2380.  For more information about the FDCA, see 21
U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000).
110 See Merck , 125 S. Ct. at 2381.
111 See id.
112 See id.  at 2383-84.
113 See id.  at 2383.
114 See id.
115 See id.  at 2382 & n.7.
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fusion.  At first blush, the research appears to be entirely non-
biological in nature, not likely to ever be mentioned in an FDA
application, and therefore not subject to exemption under 35
U.S.C. § 271(e).  However, with interdisciplinary projects so
common now, the physicist’s research might one day be utilized
by his medical-school colleagues to create methods of treating
trauma patients.  By the logic of the Integra  Court, the physicist’s
research should thereby be non-actionable as long as he claims to
have the intent to use the technology one day for a protected
purpose.  This could obviously be argued whether or not the
physicist’s work is ever actually included in an FDA application.
Indeed, to hold otherwise would seem imbalanced, since cold fu-
sion is just as important to our society as some experimental drug
uses.  Yet it seems clear that the current wording of 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e) is simply not that broad.
Many issues arise from the Supreme Court’s Integra  decision,
therefore, and it is not entirely clear how they will be resolved.
On the other hand, this is exactly how copyright fair use became
an entirely accepted common law doctrine, so much so that when
it was finally codified by Congress there was little debate about
the value of its existence or the factors relevant to its applica-
tion.116  The fair use doctrine in patent law has a long way to go
in that direction, but this is an auspicious beginning.
II
WHAT COPYRIGHT TEACHES PATENT LAW ABOUT “FAIR USE”
A. Development and Application of a Fair Use Doctrine in
Copyright Law
Copyright has a well-developed statutory doctrine of fair use.
The legislation states in relevant part that use of another’s work
“for purposes such as . . . teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of
copyright.”117  While the application of the doctrine is not always
so simple,118 it is still a good model for a statutory fair use doc-
trine in patent law.
Interestingly, while the copyright doctrine of fair use was not
codified by Congress until 1976, the doctrine existed previously
116 See infra  Parts II.A.-B.
117 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
118 See  Madison, supra  note 38, at 1551.
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in common law, not unlike the current state of the patent re-
search exemption/experimental use defense.  Furthermore, it is
well-recognized that the doctrine of fair use in copyright law
stems from the very same Justice Story who initiated a fair use
doctrine in patent law.119  These comparisons weigh heavily in
favor of logically extending to patent law the same statutory
scheme that has been afforded to copyright.
In particular, the factors considered by Justice Story to be im-
portant to a determination of fair use under copyright law
formed the basis of the balancing test later codified by Con-
gress.120  In the case of Folsom v. Marsh , Justice Story set forth
the factors to consider in evaluating whether an author could use
President Washington’s letters without permission from the copy-
right owner:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity
and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the
use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or super-
sede the objects, of the original work.121
This looks strikingly like the statutory balancing test adopted
by Congress 135 years later.122
As with his justification of fair use in patent law,123 Justice
Story captured the essence of activity that, for public policy rea-
sons, should be exempt from infringement liability.  The four-
part balancing test set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107, as further ex-
amined in Part IV.A., infra , is an adept, if imperfect, attempt to
continue providing economic incentives to the creators of intel-
lectual property,124 while providing incentives and means for
others to innovate.  While some scholars have bemoaned the fact
that with the codification of the fair use doctrine in copyright law
nothing really changed,125 the statutory enactment of fair use is
119 See  Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 876 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005); Basic Books,
Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1529 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Mueller,
supra  note 16, at 926-27.
120 17 U.S.C. § 107.
121 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901).
122 See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
123 See  Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600).
124 In this case copyright, but just as properly applied to patent law, as done by
Justice Story in Whittemore , 29 F. Cas. 1120, and Sawin v. Guild , 21 F. Cas. 554, 555
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391).
125 See  Madison, supra  note 38, at 1551.
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still quite valuable.  It serves the general public policy goals in
American law of setting reasonable expectations for the parties
and of balancing interests, while allowing room for judicial inter-
pretation of fairness on a case-by-case basis.
The statutory doctrine of fair use in copyright law has also
served as a torch in the night during an era where other aspects
of the law have shifted heavily in favor of copyright owners.  As
Professor Mark A. Lemley notes:
By virtually any measure, intellectual property rights have ex-
panded dramatically in the last three decades.  Terms of pro-
tection are longer, the number of things that are copyrightable
has increased, it is easier to qualify for copyright protection,
copyright owners have broader rights to control uses of their
works, and penalties are harsher.  In addition, Congress has
created entirely new rights.126
Recent Supreme Court interpretations upholding strong copy-
right protections make the doctrine of fair use that much more
essential.127
The doctrine of fair use should be no less important in Title 35
than it is in Title 17.  Although a grant is much easier to obtain in
copyright, and the terms are much longer, patents present an
even greater monopoly, with a significant concentration in the
hands of a few.128  Furthermore, it would seem difficult to argue
126 Lemley, supra  note 20, at 1042.  Furthermore, term extensions were upheld by
the Supreme Court after Professor Lemley’s article was written. See  Eldred v. Ash-
croft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003).
127 In addition to Eldred , which upheld term extensions well beyond a lifetime,
537 U.S. at 206-07, the Supreme Court found liability in MGM, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd. , 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (2005) (upholding strong exclusive rights of copyright
owners).  See also Rip.  Mix.  Burn , ECONOMIST, July 2, 2005, at 13, expressing dis-
content with the overprotective copyright regime created by Congress.  The article
notes the “balance” necessary between media firms (which are primarily copyright
owners) and technology firms (which are in recent times frequently accused of in-
fringing copyrights based on theories of contributory infringement). Id.  In an argu-
ment that could as easily be spoken about the current state of patent law, if not more
so because of the lack of any clear fair use doctrine outside of drug discovery, the
article sadly notes:  “Yet tech and electronics firms are also correct that holding back
new technology, merely because it interferes with media firms’ established business
models, stifles innovation and is an unjustified restraint of commerce.” Id.  In argu-
ing for a greater application by Congress of shorter copyright terms and more fair
use, the article notes that “[t]echnology has tipped the balance in favour of the pub-
lic domain.” Id.  at 14.
128 Of the 164,293 U.S. utility patents issued in 2004, twenty-five percent were
held by the top fifty patentees, with more than 10,000 held by the top five alone. See
OFFICE OF ELEC. INFO. PRODS., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENTING
BY ORGANIZATIONS: 2004 (2005), available at  www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/ac/ido/
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that a copyrighted song from the popular rapper Eminem is of
greater value to the public interest than a patented anthrax
vaccine.129
B. Other Shared Doctrines Between Copyright and Patent Law
that Justify the Comparison
Copyright and patent law are sister bodies of jurisprudence,
and they have often shared legal applications with one another.
The two were placed hand-in-hand in the Constitution by the
Founding Fathers, and they were enacted together by Congress
in 1790.130  Accordingly, several doctrines developed in patent
law — such as misuse, contributory infringement, licensee estop-
pel, and first sale — have been applied to copyright law simply
for the fact that the two are so closely related.  Just as copyright
has benefited from the development of patent law, copyright can
teach patent law about “fair use.”
In applying the doctrine of patent misuse to copyright, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lasercomb America, Inc. v.
Reynolds  discussed the reasons why it is entirely reasonable for
the two to share legal applications:
The origins of patent and copyright law in England, the treat-
ment of these two aspects of intellectual property by the fram-
ers of our Constitution, and the later statutory and judicial
development of patent and copyright law in this country per-
suade us that parallel public policies underlie the protection of
both types of intellectual property rights.131
The court further noted that “the similarity of the policies un-
derlying patent and copyright is great and historically has been
consistently recognized.”132
oeip/taf/topo_04.pdf [hereinafter USPTO, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS].  Also,
patent rights protect even against innocent, unknowing infringers, while copyright
does not provide protection against those who independently create. See O’Rourke,
supra  note 16, at 1192.
129 While rappers like Eminem are socially interesting and provide a point of
“philosophical” debate, patented technology is more likely to present significant
public health and other scientific benefits.  As noted, supra  Part I.B., locking up the
practice of such knowledge could actually be very damaging for society.  Presuma-
bly, no one dies without access to Eminem.
130 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; O’Rourke, supra  note 16, at 1181 n.6.
131 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying the doctrine of patent fair use to
copyright law in a software case); see also PORT ET AL., LICENSING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE ch. 9 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing the doctrine of
misuse).
132 Lasercomb , 911 F.2d at 976.
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Other courts have applied the patent doctrines of “licensee es-
toppel” and “contributory infringement” to copyright law with
similar rationale.  In Twin Books Corp. v. Walt Disney Co. , a fed-
eral district court followed both Supreme Court and Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals precedent in stating, “[w]here precedent in
copyright cases is lacking, it is appropriate to look for guidance
to patent law, ‘because of the historic kinship between patent law
and copyright law.’”133
Another area of patent law that has been applied to copyright
by analogy is the doctrine of “first sale” and resulting “exhaus-
tion of rights.”  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Allison
v. Vintage Sports Plaques  noted that the doctrine applies equally,
by analogy, to patent, copyright, and trademark law.134
Finally, the very doctrine of fair use has been discussed as be-
ing as applicable to patent as it is to copyright law.135  This is
entirely sensible given the similarity of development of patent
and copyright law, the multitude of doctrines that they already
share, and the fact that not only do copyright and patent law
share common origins, but so do their doctrines of “fair use.”
C. International Application of Fair Use in Patent Law
There is also precedent for a patent fair use doctrine in the
statutes of other industrialized countries.136  While the United
States does not commonly adopt laws from even its closest al-
lies,137 it is not always averse to doing so.138  In fact, Title 35 has
133 877 F. Supp. 496, 500 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Harris v. Emus Records Corp.,
734 F.2d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1984)) (extending Supreme Court’s abolition of “licen-
see estoppel” to copyright law), rev’d on other grounds , 83 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 1996).
134 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (11th Cir. 1998); see also  5 CHISUM, supra  note 5,
§ 16.03[2][a] (Supp. 2005).
135 See supra note 119.
136 Many nations have an experimental use exemption in their patent laws, includ-
ing Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Korea, and India.  John F. Duffy, Har-
mony and Diversity in Global Patent Law , 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 718 (2002);
Mueller, supra  note 16, at 969-70; see infra  notes 143-44 (Germany and Japan).
137 See, e.g. , The Insidious Wiles of Foreign Influence , ECONOMIST, June 11, 2005,
at 25. Regarding the United States Government’s fear of influence of foreign law,
particularly in the current political climate, this article states:  “Republicans have
now introduced a resolution in Congress banning inappropriate reliance on foreign
laws or judgments in interpreting the constitution.  Although almost certainly a vio-
lation of the separation of powers, it has already attracted a lot of support.” Id.  at
26.
138 5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.02[5][g]. But see PATENT PUB. ADVISORY
COMM., U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2004), available
at  http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/advisory/acrobat/ ppac_annual_04.pdf
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been significantly overhauled over the past decade to comply
with international treaty obligations.139  Such updates have in-
cluded expansion of rights covered by patent law,140 implementa-
tion of provisional patent filings,141 and, most recently, in the
pending 2005 Patent Reform Legislation, a move toward a “first
to file” system.142
The laws of Germany and Japan, for example, provide good
models for statutory research exemptions.  Section 11 of the Ger-
man Patent Code reads: “The effects of a patent shall not extend
to [1] acts done privately and for non-commercial purposes; [or]
[2] acts done for experimental purposes relating to the subject
matter of the patented invention.”143  Japan’s law similarly states:
“The effects of the patent right shall not extend to the working of
the patent right for the purposes of experiment or research.”144
Commentators have even gone so far as to argue that with the
prevalence of these types of research exemptions in other coun-
tries, where one does not exist in the United States, companies
have an economic incentive to outsource their research, thereby
negatively impacting the United States economy.145
Despite some concerns to the contrary,146 an appropriately ap-
plied fair use doctrine in United States patent law should fit
squarely within the limitations imposed by the World Trade Or-
ganization in its treaty regarding Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPS).147  Intended to curb intellectual
(describing the World Intellectual Property Organization, which administers patent
treaties as “an international bureaucracy, the priorities of which are not always al-
igned with those of the United States”).
139 5 CHISUM, supra  note 5, § 16.02[5][g].
140 Id.
141 35 U.S.C.S. § 111(b) (2005).
142 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (introduced by
Rep. Lamar Smith).
143 Patentgesetz (PatG) [Patent Law] Dec. 18, 1980, § 11, trans. available at  http://
www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/de/de081en.html [hereinafter German Patent Law]
(amended by Laws of July 16 and Aug. 16, 1998).
144 Tokkyoho [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, § 69(1), trans. available at  http://
www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/en/jp/jp036en.html [hereinafter Japanese Patent Law]
(amended by Law No. 220 of 1999).
145 Mueller, supra  note 16, at 920.  This is an interesting argument, although con-
sidering the length of time that such laws have already been in force in other coun-
tries (in Germany since 1980, in Japan since 1959), the scenario does not appear very
likely.
146 O’Rourke, supra  note 16, at 1202 & n.109 (discussing possible overbreadth of
United States copyright law outside compliance with TRIPS).
147 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
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property piracy by developing countries, TRIPS Article 30 gives
sufficient leeway to allow a doctrine of fair use in United States
patent law, just as it has been applied in other countries:  “Mem-
bers may provide limited exceptions to the exclusive rights con-
ferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent
and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties.”148
Therefore, a properly worded statutory doctrine of fair use in
United States patent law would comply with TRIPS Article 30,
provide harmonization with other nations, and put United States
researchers on a level playing field to conduct innovative re-
search without constant fear of liability.
III
THE PARADOX OF THE PATENT COMMUNITY: THE MAJOR
RESEARCH UNIVERSITY AS INFRINGER (BUT ALSO AS
OWNER . . .)
It is an interesting conundrum that it is difficult to know who is
on which side of the patent fair use debate.  The answer seems to
vary widely on a case-by-case basis.  This is due to the internally
conflicting interests of the largest players in the inventive com-
munity, who perform both research (i.e., use) and development
(i.e., ownership) of technology.  In copyright law there is a fairly
clear line between the primary owners (entertainment and pub-
lishing companies) and the primary infringers (high-tech compa-
nies, universities, and consumers).149  Not so in the patent
community, where the primary patent owners (large private com-
panies and universities) are also the primary infringers, and are
therefore loath to petition for a fair use doctrine that will benefit
their research programs but also might lower revenue for their
licensing (and litigation) units.  This Article terms that socio-eco-
nomic disincentive the “Paradox of the Patent Community.”
It is a dirty little secret of major research universities that they
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS];
see also Duffy, supra  note 136, at 718; Mueller, supra  note 16, at 971.
148 TRIPS, supra  note 147, at art. 30.
149 See supra  note 127 regarding copyright tussles between owners and users.
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are prime culprits in the Paradox of the Patent Community to the
effect that they fight fair use in patent law as much as they fight
for it.  Universities are probably some of the biggest patent in-
fringers because faculty and graduate students are unlikely to
seek patent licenses to conduct their research, and universities do
not have the resources or authority to supervise internal infringe-
ment the way private companies might (although they often do
not).  Therefore, universities have intermittently argued for a re-
search exemption in patent law.  This is the exact (unsuccessful)
argument put forth by Duke University in defense of the allega-
tions that it infringed a patent via its research programs in Madey
v. Duke University .150
At the same time, universities have become fairly major patent
owners since the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980.151  The
Bayh-Dole Act enables small businesses, nonprofit corporations,
and university recipients of federal government research funds to
take title to resulting inventions.152  Since 1980, university tech-
nology transfer has become a multi-billion dollar industry.  Al-
though any given patent is not likely to generate significant (or
any) income, the University of California alone earned over $93
million in licensing fees in fiscal year 2004.153  Overall, $1.385 bil-
lion was collected by universities in licensing revenue in 2004.154
This provides a strong economic incentive for universities to pur-
sue patent rights, including, where large amounts are at stake,
150 See  307 F.3d 1351, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  For a fuller discussion of this case
see supra  Part I.D.1.
151 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2000).  It may actually be argued that universities are
irresponsibly and overly aggressive in their patenting practices, since anyone seeing
a published or issued patent on the easily accessed USPTO website may be deterred
from practicing a socially valuable invention even though the university-owner is not
commercializing it.  Furthermore, it is probably a waste of funds for universities to
spend millions of dollars a year to sustain large portfolios of patents, many of which
are never licensed.
152 This is a generalized statement for purposes of this Article.  The Bayh-Dole
Act and its associated regulations are not simple, and proper compliance requires
some expertise.  The Act is not without controversy, either, but that is the subject of
another article.
153 Matt Krupnick, Possible Change in Patent System Could Hurt Universities ,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 13, 2005.  The University of California, representing ten
campuses, is the largest patent holder of any university, with 422 patents issued in
2004, the latest year for which data was currently available from the USPTO.
USPTO, PATENTING BY ORGANIZATIONS, supra  note 128, at B1-2.  The California
Institute of Technology has the highest number of patents issued to a single campus,
with 135 in 2004. Id.  at B1-6.
154 ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra  note 48, at 23.
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infringement suits.155
As a result of this paradox, the university community is torn.
As researchers, they want full and free access to patented tech-
nology owned by others.  As owners, however, universities are
concerned that a research exemption could be construed to pro-
tect those who would infringe university patents as much as the
reverse.  In that conflicted position, universities actually argued
against a broad interpretation of the current statutory fair use
exemption of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) at issue in Merck v. Integra .156
A number of large research universities, including the patent gi-
ant University of California, signed onto an amicus brief, which
unsuccessfully encouraged the Supreme Court to take a narrow
view of the existing statutory exemption for drug
development.157
The universities explained their interest in the case by claiming
that “the university sector’s ability to patent technology arising
from its research efforts is the basis for transferring such technol-
ogy to the public for its use and benefit.”158  This is a circular
argument.  The issue is not whether universities are getting suffi-
cient income from their technology transfer programs.  The true
public policy issue is whether allowing a broader fair use exemp-
tion provides an incentive to innovation in general such that the
public receives its just reward for the exchange of exclusivity to
an inventor (or, more commonly, the inventor’s assignee).  The
universities could not properly argue to the contrary, since uni-
versity research, by the universities’ own admission, is rarely un-
dertaken specifically for the purpose of commercialization.159
Therefore, it seems disingenuous for universities to state that an
expansion of the definition of permissible fair use under § 271(e),
as indeed ordered by the Supreme Court despite this plea,
“would have an adverse effect on the research community as a
155 A non-exhaustive search on Westlaw for “patent infringement” cases to which
a “university” is party produced 219 results (as of July 22, 2005).
156 The existence of the fair use exemption in § 271(e), and the fact that it is very
specifically limited to drug development, is probably a testament to the sharp divi-
sions in the patent community over the highly lucrative pharmaceutical business.
157 Brief of Amici Curiae Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, et al. in Sup-
port of Respondents, Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2372
(2005) (No. 03-1237) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae].  This author had no in-
volvement with the University of California’s decision to participate in the amicus
brief, nor with its drafting.
158 Id.  at 1.
159 See, e.g. , Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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whole, and the university research community in particular.”160
In fact, university research funds are generally separate from,
and much greater than, technology transfer income.161  Further-
more, there is no indication that the research money will de-
crease due to the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of
§ 271(e).162
One of the more ironic points about the Paradox of the Patent
Community evidenced in the Merck  case is the fact that infringer
Scripps, which argued for a broad fair use interpretation of
§ 271(e) in its defense, made the exact opposite argument about
the same statutory provision in another case where Scripps was
the owner rather than the infringer.163  Meanwhile, Scripps may
yet be on the other side again, since it became the proud owner
of more patents in this area during the period of infringement.164
Thus, the cycle continues, thereby providing a strong economic
disincentive via the Paradox of the Patent Community for any-
one to actually fight for a clear fair use doctrine in patent law.
Instead, universities (and other major patent owners/users)
would rather continue to sue infringers of their patents as neces-
sary165 and hope that they do not get sued in turn.166  This is un-
160 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra  note 157, at 2.
161 In 2004, the same year that universities reported $1.385 billion of income in
licensing revenue, they reported having received $41.2 billion in research funds,
sixty-seven percent of which was from the federal government. ASS’N OF UNIV.
TECH. MANAGERS, supra  note 48, at 14, 25.
162 There is not yet a clear indication of whether technology transfer revenue will
decrease, either.  Fallout from the decision has not yet been determined, but there
have been no major alerts in the university community as of yet.
163 See  Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379
(N.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part , 927 F.2d 1565 (9th Cir.
1991); see also  Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Baxter Travenol Labs., Inc., Civ.
A. No. 87-140-CMW, 1988 WL 22602 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 1988).
164 Inhibition of Angiogenesis in Disease States with an Anti-alphavbeta3
Monoclonal Antibody, U.S. Patent No. 6,887,473 (filed May 19, 1998) (issued May 3,
2005); Inhibition of Angiogenesis and Tumor Growth, U.S. Patent No. 6,803,383
(filed Sept. 27, 2002) (issued Oct. 12, 2004); Methods and Compositions Useful for
Modulation of Angiogenesis and Vascular Permeability Using SRC or Yes Tyrosine
Kinases, U.S. Patent No. 6,685,938 (filed Dec. 22, 1999) (issued Feb. 3, 2004); Meth-
ods and Compositions Useful for Inhibition of Angiogenesis, U.S. Patent No.
6,500,924 (filed Mar. 23, 1999) (issued Dec. 31, 2002); Cyclic Adhesion Inhibitors,
U.S. Patent No. 5,866,540 (filed Jan. 4, 1995) (issued Feb. 2, 1999); Methods and
Compositions Useful for Inhibition of Angiogenesis, U.S. Patent No. 5,766,591 (filed
Dec. 30, 1994) (issued June 16, 1998); Methods and Compositions Useful for Inhibi-
tion of Angiogenesis, U.S. Patent No.5,753,230 (filed Mar. 18, 1994) (issued May 19,
1998).
165 Infringement suits are not common practice for universities which have neither
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fortunate, since public policy would be served by legal clarity.167
IV
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS FOR A “FAIR”
PATENT SYSTEM
Once it has been established that a clear and consistent doc-
trine of fair use would be a beneficial addition to United States
patent law, there is the obvious practical question of how the
doctrine should be implemented.  A somewhat vague and infre-
quently applied doctrine currently exists in the common law,168
and a perhaps broader but topic-specific doctrine exists in Title
35.169  Judges can continue to use the common law doctrine to
justify further applications, but with the strictures imposed by the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals during its 2002-2003 session,170
it seems unlikely that such broadening would be upheld.  Instead,
it would be more prudent to seek a legislative solution, along the
lines of, but separate from, the existing doctrine in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e).  This Part discusses first the factors that should be
weighed in consideration of such a fair use doctrine, followed by
an analysis of compulsory licensing options in patent law.
A. Adopting a Statutory “Fair Use” Balancing Test in Title 35
A statutory scheme for fair use in patent law must be balanced,
consistent, and, indeed, “fair.”  This is perhaps most easily analo-
gized to the existing statutory doctrine of fair use in copyright
law, whereby Congress set forth a non-exhaustive list of four fac-
tors to be considered in the determination of whether an in-
the economic resources nor in most cases the desire for possibly negative public
relations, unless a significant amount of damages is at stake.
166 Infringement suits against universities and nonprofits are also not common,
although this is of course belied by the Integra  case.  There have been rumblings that
the landscape might change since Duke  unleashed the hounds.
167 While it is not surprising that universities would act in their own self interest, it
is surprising that they believe their best interest is to avoid fair use.  As patent own-
ers, universities often state that their mission is more focused on bringing technology
to the public than on making money through technology transfer programs. See
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.2d 1351, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  Yet the arguments they
made in the Merck  amicus brief are to the contrary.  Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 157.
168 See supra  Parts I.C.-E.
169 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000); see supra  Parts I.D.-E.
170 See Madey , 307 F.3d 1351; Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331
F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).  Both cases are described
more fully in Part I.D., supra .
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fringement of copyright constitutes non-actionable fair use.171
Using the same four factors as a base point, this Part analyzes
how the four factors could be applied to a test for fair use in
patent law.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use, Including Whether
Such Use is of a Commercial Nature or is for
Nonprofit Educational Purposes172
Certainly in copyright law, this first prong of the balancing test
has been interpreted with sufficient breadth to excuse some com-
mercial infringements, while not exempting some “educational”
uses.173  For universities, the two are often intertwined, since, af-
ter all, education is a “legitimate business” of educational institu-
tions.174  In patent law, this inquiry should also include questions
regarding the intent of the infringer.  At one extreme, a competi-
tor may infringe in a commercial setting to sell its own product.
At the other extreme a university researcher may test the pat-
171 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  “Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching  (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship , or research , is not an infringement of copyright.” Id.
(emphasis added).  This introduction is followed by a list of factors to be considered
in determining whether the use of a work is noninfringing. Id.
172 Id.  § 107(1).
173 See  Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1530-31
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that a duplication business reproducing unauthorized cop-
ies for university coursepacks was not exempt from infringement simply because of
an educational purpose); Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99
F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that a copyshop’s unauthorized reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works for university coursepacks was commercial in nature).
The notes of the House Judiciary Committee include the guidelines fashioned by
authors, publishers, and educational institutions on fair use for educational pur-
poses. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 67-70 (1976).  As stated, the guidelines provide the
minimum and not the maximum standards of educational fair use under Section 107,
id. , but in reality they often act as limits for conservative institutions that do not
wish to be sued, see, e.g. , UNIV. OF CALIFORNIA, 1986 POLICY AND GUIDELINES ON
THE REPRODUCTION OF COPYRIGHTED MATERIALS FOR TEACHING AND RESEARCH
(1986), available at  http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/copyright/systemwide/
pgrcmtrp.html (stating in its preamble:  “‘Fair use’ is a limited exception to the ex-
clusive use of the copyright owner, which if exceeded, can subject the one making
unauthorized copies and the University to severe penalties.”).
174 See Madey , 307 F.3d at 1356, discussed more fully in Part I.D.1., supra .  Fur-
thermore, universities frequently collaborate with industry partners to develop tech-
nologies. See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, supra  note 48, at 14 (stating that
$2.938 billion of the 2004 research funds were from industry).  Therefore, while the
nonprofit status of an infringer may be a consideration in determining fair use, it
cannot be the only, or even necessarily the most important, factor.
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ented technology simply to see if it works as claimed.175  In be-
tween are situations where a researcher infringes for the purpose
of creating an improvement, or even a non-infringing work-
around.176  This spectrum is shown visually in Diagram A.
DIAGRAM A (FACTOR 1)
Likely Not Fair Use                                                                                 Likely Fair Use 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Philosophical 
1. Use is Purely Commercial     Creating Improvement Creating Work-Around Purely
2. The Nature of the (Underlying) Work177
In patent law, this factor would consider the amount of time,
money, and effort178 that went into the patented technology.
Several questions could inform this inquiry.  Is the patented tech-
nology revolutionary or one improvement in a crowded field?
Did the patentee invest many millions to create it?  Other equita-
ble factors that might be considered include: (1) the nature of the
patentee’s business; (2) the value of the patented technology to
that business (this may weigh in favor of a compulsory license or
in some cases an injunction); and even (3) whether the technol-
ogy is owned by an individual inventor, a small or large company,
a university, or a troll.179  This spectrum is shown visually in Dia-
gram B.
175 This should already be covered by the existing common law experimental use
defense even as severely narrowed by recent federal circuit decisions. See, e.g. ,
Madey , 307 F.3d at 1361.
176 Although some scholars have suggested that infringement for the purpose of
creating improvements or work-arounds weighs against fair use, such conduct is ac-
tually socially beneficial and the results are independently patentable. See Integra
Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 876 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J.,
dissenting), vacated , 125 S. Ct. 2372 (2005).
177 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).
178 Not necessarily in that order, however.
179 Any consideration based on ownership would surely be controversial, yet it fits
as one factor to consider in the balance, depending on the value of the invention to
its owner.  In fact, universities do not rely on invention income to the same extent as
private companies, particularly small ones that may be based entirely around a sin-
gle patent.  “Trolls,” meanwhile, may rightfully claim that they rely heavily or en-
tirely on licensing income, but many see them as less sympathetic for the reason that
they did not contribute intellectually to the patents they purchase.
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DIAGRAM B (FACTOR 2)
Likely Not Fair Use                                                                                 Likely Fair Use 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Underlying technology is                                                              Underlying technology is an improvement in
revolutionary or disruptive                                                             a crowded field 
Patentee invested significantly in technology                                                  Patentee invested minimally 
Owned by Independent                     Small Business                      Large Business         University             Troll
Inventor
3. The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in
Relation to the (Underlying) Work as a Whole180
ince a patented technology is typically either infringed or not
infringed, but not frequently partially infringed, in patent law this
factor would properly focus on the type and manner, rather than
pure volume, of use.  Important issues in this prong are whether
the use is transformative, whether it is de minimus , and whether
use of the patented technology is only one of a series of steps
undertaken by the infringer.  This factor would consider the “on”
or “with” inquiry discussed by Judge Newman’s Integra  dissent,
distinguishing “between investigation into  patented things, as has
always been permitted, and investigation using  patented things,
as has never been permitted.”181  This spectrum is shown visually
in Diagram C.
DIAGRAM C (FACTOR 3)
Likely Not Fair Use                                                                                  Likely Fair Use 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Use is exact                              Some improvements by infringer                                Use is transformative 
                                                                                                         Use is de minimus 
4. The Effect of the Use upon the Potential Market for or
Value of the (Protected) Work182
In copyright law, this factor is held to be the most important in
many cases.183  After all, it is inherent in intellectual property law
that there must be some incentive to inventors,184 and in our
modern capitalist society the incentive is typically monetary.
This is even truer in patent law than in copyright, since scientific
180 Id.  § 107(3).
181 Integra , 331 F.3d at 878 n.10 (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
182 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
183 See  1 STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DO-
MESTIC OPERATIONS § 5:4 (updated by David M. Epstein 2005) (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)).
184 See supra  Part I.A. for a fuller discussion about the purposes of United States
patent law.
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experiments can be significantly more costly.185  On the other
hand, in the patent fair use scheme suggested by this Article, that
consideration is already taken into account by the first three bal-
ancing factors.
In patent law, then, this factor might actually be the least im-
portant in making a determination of fair use, and would act in-
stead as a transition to the question of compulsory licensing
where fair use is not otherwise found to be appropriate.  In that
transitional role, this factor would consider the availability of a
reasonably priced research license and whether a paid or unpaid
license is more appropriate to the facts of the case, as well as
considering whether the technology is being practiced by the
patentee.
This spectrum is shown visually in Diagram D.
DIAGRAM D (FACTOR 4)
Likely Not Fair Use                                                                                  Likely Fair Use 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A reasonably priced research license                Even non-competitors are denied access 
is easily accessible to all who qualify                                               to a license 
                                                                                                                      Technology is not being 
           commercialized by 
           patentee 
Together, the most important fair use balancing factors might
look something like the spectrum shown in Diagram E.
DIAGRAM E (COMPILATION OF FACTORS)
Likely Not Fair Use                                                                                  Likely Fair Use 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Use is Purely Commercial            Creating Improvement       Creating Work-Around        Purely 
                    Philosophical 
2. Underlying technology is                                                         Underlying technology is an improvement in 
revolutionary or disruptive                                                           a crowded field 
Patentee invested significantly in technology                                             Patentee invested minimally 
Owned by Independent                     Small Business                  Large Business             University             Troll
Inventor
3. Use is exact                   Some improvements by infringer                                       Use is transformative 
                                                                                                                      Use is de minimus 
4. A reasonably priced research license            Even non-competitors are denied access 
is easily accessible to all who qualify                                            to a license 
      Technology is not being 
     commercialized by 
      patentee 
185 Although this author might like to think that a law review article can be as
beneficial to society as some patented technology, generally such copyrightable
projects command a lot of time and effort, but not a great deal of money.
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There are many other factors that could be helpful in deter-
mining whether a particular, non-permissive use of patented
technology is fair.186  Most importantly, the test needs to provide
sufficient clarity for a reasonable determination ex ante, to avoid
the transaction costs of an unduly results-oriented (as compared
with a more appropriate intent-oriented) approach.187  If it were
to move forward with a statutory doctrine, Congress should con-
sider the varied input of technology owners and users (noting
their disincentives to change due to the Paradox of the Patent
Community), academics, and public interest groups, always
mindful of its mission to “promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts”188 as that can best be accomplished today.
B. The Value of a Compulsory License Scheme
In many cases, instead of the royalty-free license that impliedly
is granted by a determination of fair use, it may be very appropri-
ate to grant a paying, royalty-bearing compulsory license.  This
could be socially beneficial where a technology is not being
brought to the market by the patentee or where transaction costs
are very high for licensees or consumers, but where the patentee
invested significantly in the patented technology.  A compulsory
license may also be appropriate in other situations where the fair
use assessment is highly polarized in different prongs of the test
(e.g., infringer is using technology purely for commercial reasons,
but patentee is not otherwise commercializing it and has no plans
to do so).  As explored in Part IV.A., supra , the final factor of a
statutory fair use test should transition to an inquiry into the ap-
propriateness of a compulsory license.
Like fair use, a compulsory license scheme has precedent in
186 For example, Professor O’Rourke listed a number of possible considerations,
including:
(i) the nature of the advance represented by the infringement; (ii) the pur-
pose of the infringing use; (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure
that prevents a license from being concluded; (iv) the impact of the use on
the patentee’s incentives and overall social welfare; and (v) the nature of
the patented work.
O’Rourke, supra  note 16, at 1205.
187 It is appropriate to consider results in a damages assessment, of course, but
intent must be given greater value in a fair use determination. See, e.g. , Grossman,
supra  note 16, at 246.
188 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 & cl. 8.
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patent law.189  As one commentator notes, compulsory licensing
is already accepted in various provisions of United States patent
law, copyright law, Federal Trade Commission regulations, and in
foreign patent schemes.190  Several scholars have made persua-
sive arguments for compulsory licensing of biotechnology
tools.191  This could be applied more fairly to all areas of pat-
ented technology, just as it is equally available to all copyright-
able works.  This is particularly important since, as discussed in
Part I.E., supra , it is not always clear how a patented technology
will be used, and much of today’s most promising research is
interdisciplinary.
Many patented technologies, and especially most university-
owned patents, are already subject to compulsory licensing.  The
Bayh-Dole Act, which governs the disposition of technology re-
sulting from federally funded research, permits government-man-
dated compulsory licenses in two scenarios.  First, each time a
university elects to pursue patent rights in a federally funded in-
vention, it is obligated to grant a “nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice or have practiced for or
on behalf of the United States any subject invention throughout
the world.”192  Second, the federal government maintains
“march-in” rights to license or require licensing of the technol-
ogy in certain scenarios.193  At least two companies have unsuc-
cessfully petitioned the National Institutes of Health to exercise
march-in rights.194  Although the government has not yet fully
exercised this authority under the Bayh-Dole Act, recipients of
federal research funds and their licensees are ever mindful of the
possibility.195
189 See, e.g. , Strandburg, supra  note 16, at 140 (“Compulsory licensing has long
been proposed as a solution to perceived excesses of patentee exclusivity.”).
190 See Freeburg, supra  note 16, at 408-10; see also  17 U.S.C. §§ 114-115 (2000)
(relating to licensing schemes in copyright law).
191 See  Freeburg, supra  note 16, at 408; Hoffman, supra note 42, at 1036-41.
192 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000).
193 Id.  § 203.
194 For further information about these petitions, see March-In Petition from Cell-
Pro, Inc. to Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, Dep’t Health & Human Servs. (Mar. 3,
1997), available at  http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/cellpro/pdfs/foia_cellpro1.pdf;
Statement of James Love, President, Essential Inventions, Inc. on NIH Meeting on
Norvir/Ritonavir March-In Request (May 25, 2004), available at  http://
ott.od.nih.gov/Meeting/James-Love-Pres-Essential-Inventions-Inc.pdf.
195 In fact, several in the university community have noted that they may use this
to their advantage, following the decision in Madey v. Duke , which left open the
possibility of the federal government granting, hand-in-hand with research awards, a
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Compulsory licensing schemes for patented inventions are
common in other countries, particularly where there is concern
that the invention is not being “worked” by the patentee.196  This
makes sense from a public policy perspective because innovating
solely for the purpose of excluding is hardly the true purpose of
patent law.197  The incentive in that situation, if any, is purely to
stop competition in a manner unfair to the public, which does not
benefit from the invention at all, at any price or under any cir-
cumstances.  Instead, a compulsory license would give a reasona-
ble royalty to the patentee and give access to the fruits of the
innovation to the public.
Consider, for example, the patent laws of Japan and Germany,
two highly industrialized nations.  Their laws take into account
many of the issues that one would expect patentees to raise.
Both countries have successfully implemented their systems for
many years,198 and neither country is considered anathema to
creation or enforcement of patented technology.
Some of the factors that the United States may consider bor-
rowing from these successful models include:
1. The amount of time lapsed since the filing date of the pat-
ented technology.199
2. The amount of time during which the “patented invention
has not been sufficiently and continuously worked.”200
3. A procedure for “consultations” between the patentee and
the person who seeks the compulsory license.201
4. A procedure for seeking arbitration if consultations are not
successful.202
license to infringe someone else’s patented technology that was also federally
funded. See  Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).  This would,
though, be at best a partial and imbalanced solution, for the university community
and others.
196 See  German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 11; Japanese Patent Law, supra
note 144, § 69(1).
197 See supra  Part I.A. for a fuller discussion about the purpose of United States
patent law.
198 See supra notes 143-44.
199 German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 24(5) (after grant of the patent); Japa-
nese Patent Law, supra  note 144, § 83(1) (four years).
200 Japanese Patent Law, supra  note 144, § 83(1) (three years).
201 German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 24 (requiring that (1) “the applicant for
a license has unsuccessfully endeavored during a reasonable period of time to obtain
from the patentee consent to exploit the invention under reasonable conditions
usual in trade;” and (2) “public interest commands the grant of a compulsory li-
cense”); Japanese Patent Law, supra  note 144, § 83.
202 Japanese Patent Law, supra  note 144, § 83(2); see also  German Patent Law,
supra  note 143, § 81(1) (allowing remedy by “legal action”).
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5. Formal requirements and hearings, including, importantly,
an opportunity for a patentee to submit a “legitimate rea-
son” for not working the patented invention.203
6. Explanation of the terms of the compulsory license, includ-
ing “scope,” “consideration,” and “method and time of
payment.”204
7. Application to conflicts and improvements.205
Interestingly, the proposed Patent Reform Act of 2005 shows
movement toward a broader acceptance of compulsory licensing
in the United States.  A proposed amendment would limit a pat-
entee’s automatic right to an injunction by taking into account
the patentee’s use of the technology.206  This is akin to other
countries’ grant of compulsory licenses for not working the in-
vention.207  Predictably acting as much against as for their inter-
est under the paradigm of the Paradox of the Patent Community,
university representatives have fought against relaxation of in-
junctions, even though universities probably infringe as often as
they own patents, and could easily be enjoined themselves.208
A compulsory license scheme in United States patent law
could be effectively administered by a Collective Rights Organi-
zation (CRO), as has successfully been done in copyright.209  In a
CRO scheme, industry participants, rather than ex ante statutes
203 Japanese Patent Law, supra  note 144, §§ 84-85.
204 German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 24(5); Japanese Patent Law, supra  note
144, § 86(2).  In Germany, “[t]he patentee shall be entitled to remuneration from the
holder of a compulsory license that shall be commensurate with the circumstances
and shall take into consideration the commercial value of the compulsory license.”
German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 24(5).  There is also a provision for this to be
adjusted as necessary over time. Id.
205 German Patent Law, supra  note 143, § 24(2); Japanese Patent Law, supra  note
144, §§ 72, 92(2).
206 Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 7 (2005) (introduced by
Rep. Lamar Smith).
207 See, e.g. , Japanese Patent Law, supra  note 144, § 83(1).
208 See  Goldie Blumenstyk, University Researchers Worry as Pressure Builds in
Congress to Reform the Patent System , CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 16, 2005 (on
file with author), available at  http://chronicle.com (“At least one official whose insti-
tution is a leader in patenting, Carl E. Gulbrandsen, says some of the proposed
changes would be ‘a step backward for university patenting and commercialization
efforts.’”).  Mr. Gulbrandsen is absolutely right that sometimes injunctions are ap-
propriate, but the new proposals merely would require patentees to make an ade-
quate showing to obtain one, as with most other areas of law.  Due to aggressive
lobbying by universities and other large patent owners, the proposed relaxation of
injunctions already seems to be a non-starter in the 2005-2006 Congress.  It is, how-
ever, being considered in parallel by the Supreme Court. See  discussion supra  note
33.
209 See  Hoffman, supra note 42, at 1039.
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or ex post court decisions, set the licensing rates.210  This makes
the rates more likely to fit market conditions and more easily
adjustable with them.211  In the case of patent law, as noted in
Part III, supra , the Paradox of the Patent Community means that
the users are the owners, but this can be a real benefit in the
CRO scheme because it will act as an economic incentive to all
participants.  A CRO scheme could standardize the rules, rates,
and situations where litigation (or preferably for most, arbitra-
tion), and even injunctions, become appropriate.
Where compulsory licensing has been applied in patent law it
has met with success.  As discussed by Professor Janice M. Muel-
ler: “Some recent scholarship rejects the historically-accepted
categorical assumption that compulsory licensing harms the in-
centives for innovation that patents represent.”212  Indeed, the
idea has already been successfully implemented in sister-copy-
right law, the patent laws of international economic partners, and
some areas within the current United States patent law.  As with
fair use, there is a strong case for implementing a clear and com-




As explored in this Article, a finding of fair use would not be
appropriate in every case of patent infringement.  To argue oth-
erwise would be to decimate all incentives of the somewhat be-
fuddled, but still highly functional, United States patent system.
Sometimes a compulsory license would be more appropriate, and
in some cases only an injunction will suffice to serve the needs of
the patentee and public policy.  A truly informed analysis of the
options would require a very clear, comprehensive, and consist-
ently applied fair use doctrine that does not exist in United
States patent law today.
Copyright, which shares many other applications with patent
law, provides a framework for considerations of fair use in patent
law.  International economic partners provide models in their
210 See id.  at 1039-40.
211 Id.  at 1040.
212 Mueller, supra  note 16, at 968 (citing Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What
Price to Innovation:  Does the Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Inno-
vation? , 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 853, 880-91 (2003)).
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patent laws as well.  Congress is currently considering significant
amendments to the United States patent laws.  In doing so, it
should consider one of the most important historical principles of
patent law — fair access to the patented technology.  Public pol-
icy dictates that it would be highly logical for patentees and in-
fringers alike (perhaps even more so when, like universities, they
are one and the same) to have reasonable expectations of access
without undue litigation and cross-allegations.
Simply put, United States patent law needs a doctrine of fair
use, and Congress need only follow its own lead in copyright to
make it happen.
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